(5) Conlcluisionis coicermniug the catuses of the nteuirosis persislelice or recovery.-From the previous factual analysis it emerges that neither living con(litions prior to the experience, nor the nature of the bombing experience are important factors for persistence. But personality defects, severe emotional reaction at the time, and possiblv disturbing effects of the incident on the individual's pattern of living are likelv to predispose to this. other important factors emerged from the individual assessments. While in the analysis continuance of living in the district did not appear to predispose, it must be remembered that several evacuees were not seen. Continuance despite lack of confidence did appear to be an important cause of persistence; delayed return to normal work, interests and activities were similarly found to be important. Clearly the individual may be helped by the Doctor or Social Agencies: apart from any other treatment, they may reduce these strains, promote an environment and attitude suitable for recovery, making appropriate adljustments as his condition improves. In thcse ways they had helped in some instances, in the majority they had intervened little or not at all, and in others thev had even hindered bv encouraging opposite attitudes and tendencies. Another relevant factor was the tendency for the neurosis to become very chronic if a disorder of moderate severity lasted over one or two months (see Table I ); this suggests the importance of assisting recovery wvhen this does not appear to be commencing within the earlv weeks.
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SUMMARY
(1) A grotup of cases, wvho had been admitted to F.A.P.s in one English city during a period of heavy bombing, was followed up ten months later; all the traceable cases (127-76% of the possible sample) were visited; a severe personal experience had been the main reason for admission in 55%, and had preceded the admission in 75%.
(2) Of those who had been buried for over one hour (35) following the experience, while 55% neither evacuated nor moved permanentlv to a safer area of the citv. During the raid ten months later 51 % were abnormallv anxiouis, and 590/ had become more nervous during the raids.
(4) The causes of neurosis development or persistence were studiedl on the whole group who had suffered personal involvement (94).
(5) It appears that neurosis is likely to follow severe personal air-raid experiences, which at the time upset the individual emotionally, or prodcuced a seriousiupset in the pattern of his living by destroying a much-esteemed home or a close friend, especially, but not only, if he is of unstable personality and was at the time living under some other strain. At the outbreak of wvar there were about 3,000 private patients on the books. Patients insured under the National Health Insurance Scheme have not been included in this study. They were mainly lower middle class, with a sprinkling of higher social grades, and were a fair sample of the district, except that the ratio of females to males was 2: 1 as; wives of panel patients would be included but not the husbands.
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To study the incidence of neurosis in war, we must first define what is meant by the term " neurosis " for this purpose. In the mild cases seen in general practice the question of physical predisposition is much more important than in the chronic or severer cases seen by the psychiatrist. It is a commonplace to see in the same patient a mild anxiety state or depression associated at one time with an infection, at another time with psychological stress. Symptoms or signs referable to disturbed functioning of the nervous system may occur with, and be symptomatic of, structural physical disorder, and yet be aggravated by either the progress of the disease or by psychological factors. The relation of physical factors to the mental ill-health may be-of all degrees, from mere concomitance to main cause, and the predisposition may frequently be both physical and psychological, the proportions varyingfrom case to case, and in the same case at different times. To disentangle such factors which might be either cause or effect in the same case would make the task unnecessarily complex, and it was, therefore, decided to study nervous symptoms rather than strict neurosis. Under this heading would be included such symptoms as nervousness, depression, insomnia without obvious physical cause, and such signs as those of somatic anxiety or conversion hysteria. In practice about half the cases seen had physical disorders also, due partly to the foregoing considerations and partly to the fact that many of these patients were not accustomed to seek treatment for minor nervous disturbances, and only came when some physical disorder gave them an excuse.
The number of such patients seen in the two years was 330, but as 20 had incomplete records they are excluded from analysis, although they appear in the,attcndance figures.
A further 35 were not known prior to the period studied and are rejected, leaving 275. Of these, 234 had nervous symptoms during this period and the remaining 41 were seen for physical illness, but had a known predisposition to nervous symptoms. Known predisposition is rigidly defined as having had treatment for such symptoms before September 1940, and generally, it was pre-war. Anxious personality, mild enough never to have required treatment, even bromides added to their medicine, was disregarded, as was inference from present symptoms.
The inquirv falls naturally into two periods, September 1940-May 1941, during which the air raids on this district occurred, and June 1941-August 1942, when the district was raid free. The incidence of neurosis in the first period has also been reviewed by Dr. Aubrey Lewis in the Lancet (1942 (ii) 175).
The amount of bombing was about average for a London suburb. Severe experience was small and only nine of these patients had been bombed out of their houses, although this had occurred to some other patients also, without the development of nervous symptoms. Broken windows and minor damagc to houses was common. Two had had relatives killed in their presence; a number had seen injuries and a smaller number sustained injuries.
To study the incidence of nervous symptoms, a comparison has been made with 1937, which was the last peaceful year. In this year there were nearly 8,000 attendances among 1,237 patients, and 30% of the attendances were for nervous symptoms. The picture changes, however, when we look at the monthly distribution. Fig. 1 gives the percentage of total attendance which was for nervous symptoms, and, in 1937, shown by the dotted line, the percentage ranges from 20% in the winter, when physical illness is frequent, to 41 % in the summer when such illness is low, chronic neurosis being little subject to seasonal fluctuation. The other line gives the corresponding percentages for the period studied, and it will be seen that September, October and November 1940 were abnormally high, whereas the remainder of the year was about normal, with minor variations, due to seasonal differences. The percentage for these three months was 41 % as against 32%
for the corresponding period in 1937. Percentages, rather than absolute figures, are used as being more reliable for an available population fluctuating in size.
To interpret this, one must consider whether the composition of the population had altered materially. That considerable movement of population had occurred is shown by fig. 2 , which gives the total attendances, compared with the normal curve of illness, based on ten years' average. This demonstrates the effect of evacuation at the beginning of the war, but shows that, by September 1940, attendance had nearly returned to normal, and most evacuees, apart from children, had returned. A fresh evacuation caused another sharp drop in September 1940, with a continued fall for three months. Individual casehistories show that evacuation proceeded steadily during these three months, and then practically ceased. How did this affect the proportion of patients predisposed to nervous symptoms who remained? An investigation of the percentage evacuation amongst the different groups of these patients, showed that aggravated cases evacuated more than stationary, and predisposed more than non-predisposed. Hence there was a differential evacuation of the predisposed, a sort of natural selection, and although many of the evacuated came up to see me periodically, they attended less often than normally, and there must have been a still greater relative rise than the graph indicates.
There was no change in the sex ratio which, as in 1937, was two females to one male for all illness; and 3 females to one male for nervous illness. The average age of this To test whether an apparent rise might be due to a fall in physical illness, the expected attendance for each kind of illness was calculated by deducting the effect of evacuation, the amount of the latter being known by a local official survey. It was then found that the attendances for physical illness, in the three months, were so far short of the expected figure, that it must mean that people were not bothering about minor illness. This wa& known to occur by the reports of patients, but that people were equally neglecting their nervous illness is shown by the fact that the ratio of attendances, per patient, was running at an equally low figure for both.
It must, therefore, be concluded that there was a small but real increase in nervous symptoms, sufficiently marked to require treatment for them, during September, October and November 1940. What-was-regarded as a normal degree of apprehension in relation to air raids has not been included.
During the next six months of air raids, nervous symptoms were 30% as against 29% for the corresponding period of 1937, and the curve is of approximately normal shape. Evacuation had now ceased. The total attendance curve shows the usual seasonal fluctuations, but the amount of attendance was about half normal. I'his was due to the absence of epidemics, the continued neglect of minor illness and later on, mv own absence on other work. There is other evidence that the impact of the air raids had worn off. Case-histories showed that mild cases had largely cleared up. The ratio of attendances tbpatients for aervbus illness had risen slightly, as mild cases ceased to attend, but was stil? below the normal figure, due partly to evacuation of chronics, as well as failing to attend for treat-ment. If'one allows for the evacuatioh of the neurotically predisposed, there was probably a very small rise persisting in this period. These factors were, naturally, often multiple, but if a somewhat arbitrary selection of the mainfactor be made, more than half the cases were not directly related to the war, and, in one third of the total, war problems predominated. Air raids were relatively more important in those of known predisposition. Physical disease was the main factor in 8%, but contributed in others. Where air raids were a factor, the first attendance was in the first three months in 71%, whereas where war problems were factors, only half the cases attended so early. Thus air raids graduallv decreased in importance, and war problems rose.
The number of attendances and duration of treatment for the exacerbation or illness, showed a close correlation between predisposition and severity, as judged bv this standard. Thus: the 28 aggravated chronic cases, averaged nine attendances over sixteen weeks; the 58 aggravated predisposed, four attendances over six weeks; and the 27 non-predisposed, two attendances over three weeks. Clinical records confirmed this, and neurosis of any severity was almost unknown, without known predisposition. About half the predisposed had mild illnesses and about three-quarters of the non-predisposed. Proceedlwngs of the Royal Society oJ Medicine 1() been that although mild, they tend to be more prolonged, and not to recover so completely. This would correlate with the fact that causal factors are persisting in nmanv of them.
The question of the extent to which those of known predisposition developed a nervous illness or exacerbation. may now be answered. Of 228 such patients seen, 38% were aggravated in the first period and 24% in the second period, btut one-third remained well, 
